A backdoor set of a CNF formula is a set of variables such that fixing the truth values of the variables from this set moves the formula into a polynomial-time decidable class. In this work we obtain several algorithmic results for solving d-SAT, by exploiting backdoors to d-CNF formulas whose incidence graphs have small treewidth.
A backdoor set of a CNF formula is a set of variables such that fixing the truth values of the variables from this set moves the formula into a polynomial-time decidable class. In this work we obtain several algorithmic results for solving d-SAT, by exploiting backdoors to d-CNF formulas whose incidence graphs have small treewidth.
For a CNF formula φ and integer t, a strong backdoor set to treewidth t is a set of variables such that each possible partial assignment τ to this set reduces φ to a formula whose incidence graph is of treewidth at most t. A weak backdoor set to treewidth t is a set of variables such that there is a partial assignment to this set that reduces φ to a satisfiable formula of treewidth at most t. Our main contribution is an algorithm that, given a d-CNF formula φ and an integer k, in time 2 O(k) |φ|,
• either finds a satisfying assignment of φ, or
• reports correctly that φ is not satisfiable, or
• concludes correctly that φ has no weak or strong backdoor set to treewidth t of size at most k.
As a consequence of the above, we show that d-SAT parameterized by the size of a smallest weak/strong backdoor set to formulas of treewidth t, is fixedparameter tractable. Prior to our work, such results were know only for the very special case of t = 1 (Gaspers and Szeider, ICALP 2012). Our result not only extends the previous work, it also improves the running time substantially. The running time of our algorithm is linear in the input size for every fixed k. Moreover, the exponential dependence on the parameter k is asymptotically optimal under Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH).
Introduction
There is a mysterious disparity in the way the Boolean Satisfiability problem (also often referred to as Propositional Satisfiability and abbreviated as SAT) is perceived by different communities in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence. From a theoretician's perspective, since SAT is NP-complete, the existence of an efficient algorithm for this problem is highly unexpected. Even worse, all currently known algorithms for SAT with n variables, in the worst case, do not perform significantly better than a trivial brute-force algorithm trying all possible 2 n assignments to the variables [5] . On the other hand, in practice, modern SAT solvers can solve instances with hundreds thousands of variables within seconds. According to Malik and Zhang [21] , similar to mathematical programming tools or linear equation solvers, SAT solvers have matured to the point to be used in a wide range of application domains. Thus encoding a problem as an instance of SAT and then applying a SAT solver is a success story for many applications. Understanding the reasons for such a huge discrepancy between theory and practice is not only an intellectual challenge, it also can bring us closer to even faster SAT solvers.
The notion of backdoors to SAT was introduced by Williams et al. in [26] in an effort towards a rigorous understanding of the surprising performance of SAT solvers in practice. Roughly speaking, backdoors are small sets of variables capturing the overall combinatorics of the SAT instance. The definition of backdoors is based on the notion of a polynomial time algorithm, a sub-solver, solving tractable instances of SAT. A sub-solver is an algorithm A which, given a formula φ, in polynomial time either rejects the input or correctly solves φ. Furthermore, given any partial assignment τ to the variables of φ, if A solves φ, then A also solves the reduced instance φ[τ ]. For example, A can be an algorithm solving φ if it is an instance of 2-SAT and rejecting all other instances.
A nonempty subset B of the variables is a weak backdoor to φ for a sub-solver A if there exists an assignment τ to the variables in B such that A returns a satisfying assignment of the reduced instance φ[τ ]. We say that B is a strong backdoor to φ for a sub-solver A if for each assignment τ to the variables in b, A solves φ[τ ], i.e. either returns a satisfying assignment or concludes unsatisfiability of φ[τ ]. It appears that many instances in practice happen to have small "weak" or "strong" backdoors for different sub-solvers [20, 26] . There has been an extensive theoretical study of backdoors to different sub-solvers in the realm of parameterized complexity [23, 25, 16] . We refer to the surveys of Gaspers and Szeider [15] for more background.
One of the well-studied classes of SAT solvable in polynomial time is the class of "decomposable" formulas. In particular, the tree-(and its close relative branch-) width measures have been applied to satisfiability in the following way. If the treewidth of the incidence graph (the bipartite graph on the variables and clauses where a variable is adjacent to all the clauses containing it) does not exceed some constant, then SAT for such formulas can be decided in polynomial time [6, 11, 24] .
Since the property of having an incidence graph with small treewidth makes SAT polynomial time solvable, it is very natural to ask about backdoors to a subsolver on formulas of bounded treewidth. The study of such backdoors from the parameterized complexity perspective was initiated by Gaspers and Szeider in [14, 16] . In [14] , Gaspers and Szeider study the problem of detecting a weak backdoor of size at most k to acyclic SAT, i.e, a weak backdoor to a sub-solver on formulas with incidence graphs of treewidth at most 1. They show that this problem is W[2]-hard in general but FPT on d-CNF formulas for fixed d, when parameterized by k. In [16] Gaspers and Szeider gave an FPT-approximation algorithm for strong backdoor set to treewidth at most t which either detects in time f (k)n 3 , for some function f , a strong backdoor of size at most 2 k or reports that there is no strong backdoor of such size.
Let W η be a class of formulas of treewidth at most η. Let us note that for a formula φ, the minimum sizes of weak and strong W η -backdoor sets can be very different. For a satisfiable formula the minimum size of a weak backdoor does not exceed the size of a strong one. However, this is not true for unsatisfiable formulas. For example, any unsatisfiable formula does not have a weak backdoor but it could have a small strong backdoor. In this work we give an FPT algorithm for d-SAT parameterized by the minimum of both sizes. Formally, our main result is the following. Theorem 1.1. There is an algorithm that takes as input a d-CNF formula φ and an integer k, runs in time 2 O(k) |φ| and
• either finds a satisfying assignment of φ, or • reports correctly that φ is not satisfiable, or • concludes correctly that φ has no weak or strong W η -backdoor set of size at most k.
The main features of our result as well as the techniques are the following.
* It extends the tractability results for d-SAT in [14] to a significantly larger class of d-CNF formulas. Furthemore, although our algorithm for d-SAT does not rely on actually computing the entire backdoor sets, our methods show that a weak backdoor set to treewidth at most t can in fact be detected in FPT time.
* The running time of our algorithm is 2 O(k) |φ|, that is, it has a single exponential dependence on the parameter and linear dependence on the input length |φ|. It is also easy to show that unless the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails, there is no 2 o(k) |φ| O(1) solving d-SAT for every d ≥ 3 [17] . Thus, our algorithm is asymptotically optimal. * On the way to obtaining our algorithm we develop a new deterministic linear time protrusion replacer algorithm (we refer to Preliminaries for the definition of a protrusion replacer). Prior to our work the best deterministic protrusion replacer was of running time O(n log 2 n) [7] . This improvement implies a speedup for many parameterized and kernelization algorithms based on protrusion replacements. In particular, due to this replacement, all kernelization algorithms obtained in [2, 8, 9, 12, 19] and parameterized algorithms from [7, 19] can be implemented to run in deterministic linear time.
[7] merely provide a starting point and need to be built upon in a problem specific way to detect backdoor sets. To further confirm this intuition, we show that under standard complexity theoretic assumptions, the problem of detecting a weak W η -backdoor does not admit a polynomial kernel. This separates the kernelization complexity of the two "related" problems because the vertex removal problem does in fact admit a polynomial kernel [7] .
We briefly describe the ideas involved in our randomized algorithm, which are somewhat easier to explain. We say that a subset S of a graph G is a W η -modulator if the treewidth of G − S is at most η. Our starting point is the observation that if X is a subset of variables that form a strong (or weak) W η -backdoor, then the set of their neighbours in the incidence graph, N (X), is a W η -modulator. Note that |N (X)| could be arbitrarily large compared to |X|. In particular, it is futile to attempt to look for a small W η -modulator among the clauses. We begin with a linear-time preprocessing procedure which ensures that for every W η -backdoor set X, the set N (X) is incident with a large fraction of the edges in G. Therefore, if we pick an edge uniformly at random, the clause endpoint of the edge belongs to N (X) with constant probability. Further, since the clauses are of constant size d, we have that a randomly chosen variable from the clause belongs to X with some probability f (d, η) > 0.
Having located a variable in the backdoor, when we are working with SAT using weak backdoors, the algorithm simply branches on the chosen variable x in the usual way: in one branch, we simplify the formula by setting x to 1, and in the other branch, we set x to 0. At this point, we recurse. However, when working with SAT using strong backdoors, it is not clear that this approach can be used as it is. Our algorithm solving SAT using weak backdoors exploits the fact that a formula admits a weak backdoor if and only if it is satisfiable. On the other hand, in the case of strong backdoors, we are faced with three possible scenarios -that the formula does not admit a small strong backdoor, or that it does, and it is either satisfiable or not. Combining the varied recursive outputs appropriately is less obvious in this situation. The typical approach for solving SAT using strong backdoors involves first finding a strong backdoor using a search tree similar to the above. The set output by the recursive procedure is the union of all the recursively obtained solutions and thus its size can be proportional to the size of the search tree, often 2 k . Finally, SAT is solved in the standard way, which involves trying all possible truth assignments of the strong backdoor, and therefore, the overall expense incurred for solving SAT is 2
. Under ETH, even if we are given a strong backdoor of size , we do not expect algorithms solving SAT in time 2 o( ) |φ| O (1) . Fortunately, it turns out that detecting backdoors is not a prerequisite to solving SAT. Indeed, in our algorithms, we sidestep the problem of detecting strong backdoors, and directly achieve a running time of 2 O(k) |φ|, where k is the size of a smallest W η -strong backdoor to φ. As side-effect of this, our algorithm does not count all the satisfying assignments.
One of the main ingredients of our algorithm is the linear time preprocessing step which ensures that a large fraction of the edges are incident with the neighbors of every backdoor set. Towards this we give a new deterministic linear time "protrusion replacer" which has several applications in kernelization and parameterized algorithms. A protrusion is a subgraph that has constant treewidth and a constant-sized neighbourhood. Protrusions were employed in [2, 9] for obtaining metakernelization theorems for problems on sparse graphs like planar and H-minor-free graph. Our new protrusion replacer algorithm begins by enumerating all connected sets of size p with neighbourhood of size q. By a classical lemma of Bollobás [18] , it can be shown that the number of such sets is at most p+q p . However, for the purposes of developing the protrusion replacer, we use the enumeration algorithm proposed by Fomin and Villanger [10] in the context of designing exact algorithms for treewidth. Given these n · p+q p sets, we carefully partition them into groups such that each of them form protrusions that are mutually internally disjoint (that is, while they may share their boundaries, their interiors do not overlap). We are also able to prove that these protrusions together account for a large fraction of the vertices appearing in any "collection of protrusions".
Having found these protrusions, we need an algorithm that can reduce protrusions, that is, remove these protrusions and replace them with smaller ones maintaining equivalence. We note that the known results about protrusion replacement cannot be used directly here. The existing machinery for replacing protrusions relies crucially on the notion of finite integer index. However, in our context, defining an appropriately equivalent notion applicable in the usual way seems rather difficult. Thus, we resort to the "finite state" style of making protrusion replacement. Also this is a more practical and arguably more direct line of attack. We consider a tree decomposition of the protrusion and analyze it to identify bags that are "equivalent", and then suggest a suitable reduction rule. The methods described here are similar in spirit to the ideas used in [13] for kernelization.
Preliminaries 2.1 CNF Formulas and Assignments
We consider propositional formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF). We assume, without loss of generality, that the clauses do not contain a pair of complementary literals. For a CNF formula φ, we use var(φ) and cla(φ) to refer to the sets of variables and clauses in φ, respectively. We say that a variable x is positive (negative) in a clause C if x ∈ C (x ∈ C), and we write var(C) for the set of variables that are positive or negative in C, while we use lit(C) to denote the set of literals in C.
The length of a formula φ is given by |var(φ)| + C∈cla(φ) (1 + |var(C)|) and is denoted by |φ|. A truth assignment τ is a mapping from a set of variables, denoted by var(τ ), to {0, 1}. A truth assignment τ satisfies a clause C if it sets at least one positive variable of C to 1 or at least one negative variable of C to 0. A truth assignment τ of var(φ) satisfies the formula φ if it satisfies all clauses of φ. The satisfiability problem (SAT) of a CNF formula φ is to decide whether F has a satisfying truth assignment.
Given a CNF formula φ and a truth assignment τ , φ[τ ] denotes the truth assignment reduct of φ under τ , which is the CNF formula obtained from φ by first removing all clauses that are satisfied by τ and second removing from the remaining clauses all literals x, x with x ∈ var(τ ). For a formula φ and a subset of clauses C ⊆ cla(φ), we use φ \ C to denote the formula φ with the clauses in C removed.
The incidence graph of a CNF formula φ, inc(φ), is the bipartite graph whose vertices are the variables and clauses of φ, and where vertices corresponding to a variable x and a clause C are adjacent if and only if x ∈ var(C). Further, an edge between a vertex corresponding to x ∈ var(φ) and C ∈ cla(φ) has the label + if x ∈ lit(C) and is labeled − if x ∈ lit(C).
We refer to the class of two-edge colored bipartite graphs as SAT incidence graphs, or incidence graphs for short. Typically, we use (G = (X, C), E, ) to denote an incidence graph, where : E → {+, −}. The formula ψ(G) is defined over the variable set {x v | v ∈ X}, with a clause C u for every u ∈ C. Further, the clause C u consists of the literals:
For an incidence graph G, we abuse notation and use var(G) to refer to the vertices of G that correspond to variables in ψ(G), and cla(G) to refer to the vertices of G that correspond to clauses in ψ(G). Also, for a vertex subset X ⊆ V (G), we continue to use the notations var(X) and cla(X) to refer to the sets var(G)∩ X and cla(G) ∩ X, respectively.
We say that G is an incidence graph of order d if G is an incidence graph where the maximum degree among the vertices in cla(G) is bounded by d. Note that these graphs correspond to d-CNF formulas (where a d-CNF formula involves clauses of length at most d).
Let B denote a fixed class of formulas under consideration. A weak B-backdoor set of a CNF formula φ is a set B of variables such that there is a truth assignment τ of the variables in B such that the formula φ[τ ] is satisfiable and φ[τ ] ∈ B. Such an assignment is called a witness assignment for the weak backdoor. A strong B-backdoor set of F is a set B of variables such that for each truth assignment τ of the variables in B, the formula φ[τ ] is in B.
We let K η denote the class of formulas φ for which inc(F ) excludes the (η × η) grid as a minor (c.f. Subsection 2.3 for the relevant definitions), and let wb g (φ, η) (respectively, sb g (φ, η)) denote the smallest possible size of a weak (respectively, strong) K η backdoor. Also, we let W η denote the class of formulas φ for which inc(F ) has treewidth at most η (c.f. Subsection 2.2 for the relevant definition), and let wb tw (φ, η) (respectively, sb tw (φ, η)) denote the smallest possible size of a weak (respectively, strong) W η backdoor. Note that wb g (φ, η) ≤ wb tw (φ, η), and sb g (φ, η) ≤ sb tw (φ, η), since every backdoor to W t is also a backdoor to K t (although the converse is not necessarily true).
2.2 Treewidth. Let G be a graph. A tree decomposition of G is a pair (T, X = {X t } t∈V (T ) ) where T is a tree and X is a collection of subsets of V (G) such that:
We call the vertices of T nodes and the sets in X bags of the tree decomposition (T, X ). The width of (T, X ) is equal to max{|X t | − 1 | t ∈ V (T )} and the treewidth of G is the minimum width over all tree decompositions of G.
Minors
Given an edge e = xy of a graph G, the graph G/e is obtained from G by contracting the edge e, that is, the endpoints x and y are replaced by a new vertex v xy which is adjacent to the old neighbors of x and y (except from x and y). A graph H obtained by a sequence of edge-contractions is said to be a contraction of G. We denote it by H ≤ c G. A graph H is a minor of a graph G if H is the contraction of some subgraph of G and we denote it by H ≤ m G. We say that a graph G is H-minor-free when it does not contain H as a minor.
We also say that a graph class G is H-minor-free (or, excludes H as a minor) when all its members are Hminor-free. It is well-known [22] that if H ≤ m G then tw(H) ≤ tw(G). We will also use the fact that every graph of treewidth at least η 100 contains the (η ×η) grid as a minor [4] . We also use η to denote the (η × η) grid.
Protrusions and Protrusion Replacement
For a graph G and S ⊆ V (G), we define ∂ G (S) as the set of vertices in S that have a neighbor in
When it is clear from the context, we omit the subscripts. A r-protrusion in a graph G is a set X ⊆ V such that |∂(X)| ≤ r and tw(G[X]) ≤ r. Further, a (r, s)-protrusion is a set X ⊆ V such that |∂(X)| ≤ r and tw(G[X]) ≤ s. If G is a graph containing a r-protrusion X and X is a r-boundaried graph, the act of replacing X by X means replacing G by G
Let G be the incidence graph of a formula F . A variable r-protrusion in G is a r-protrusion such that all the vertices in ∂(X) correspond to variables of F .
A protrusion replacer for a parameterized graph problem Π is a family of algorithms, with one algorithm for every constant r. The r'th algorithm has the following specifications. There exists a constant r (which depends on r) such that given an instance (G, k) and an r-protrusion X in G of size at least r , the algorithm runs in time O(|X|) and outputs an instance (G , k ) such that (G , k ) ∈ Π if and only if (G, k) ∈ Π, k ≤ k and G is obtained from G by replacing X by a rboundaried graph X with less than r vertices. Observe that since X has at least r vertices and X has less than r vertices this implies that |V (G )| < |V (G)|.
Algorithms for d-SAT using K η -Backdoors
In this section, we present our algorithms for solving SAT, which are described assuming the existence of algorithms that we call reducers. We provide the description of the reducers in the full version of this work, and also explicit algorithms that replace protrusions while preserving satisfiability as well as the existence of small backdoor sets.
We begin by presenting a linear time randomized algorithm for d-SAT parameterized by the size of a weak K η -backdoor set. We then give a deterministic version of this algorithm while still managing to achieve the optimal asymptotic dependence on the parameter and the formula size. Following this, we present our algorithm for d-SAT parameterized by the size of a strong K η -backdoor set. We conclude this subsection with a proof sketch of the fixed parameter tractability of computing weak W η -backdoor sets.
The basis of the randomized (and subsequently, the deterministic) algorithms is the fact that the reducers ensure that the vertices corresponding to backdoors are always incident with a large fraction of the edges in the incident graph. This property is formalized by the following definition.
Definition 3.1. Let G be a graph and let S ⊆ V (G). Also, let 0 < ρ < 1. We call S a ρ-cover for
• |φ | ≤ |φ|.
• For every 0 ≤ k ≤ |var(φ)|, φ has a weak Qbackdoor set of size at most k if and only if φ has a weak Q-backdoor set of size at most k.
• every set of variables which forms a weak Qbackdoor set for the formula φ is a ρ-cover of φ .
• if τ is a satisfying assignment for φ then τ is a satisfying assignment for φ.
A (sb, Q, ρ)-reducer is defined analogously with respect to strong Q-backdoor sets along with the additional property that the formula φ computed by A is explicitly required to be equivalent to φ.
3.1 d-SAT parameterized by weak K η -backdoor sets We now turn to the descriptions of the algorithms. We first present an accessible description of a randomized algorithm for d-SAT when parameterized by the size of weak K η -backdoor sets. Subsequently, we show that there is also a single-exponential deterministic algorithm.
Then, Algorithm Randomized-FPT-SAT-Weak (Figure 1 ) on input φ and an integer k, runs in time
• If φ has a weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k then with probability at least ( ρ 2(d+1) ) k , the algorithm computes a satisfying assignment of φ.
Randomized-FPT-SAT-weak(φ,k)
φ 0 := φ, i := 0 While (inc(φ i ) has treewidth more than η 100 ) proceed as follows:
1. If k ≤ 0 return that φ i does not have a k-sized weak K η -backdoor set .
2. Execute algorithm A 1 on φ i and obtain an equivalent formula φ i .
3. Pick an edge e ∈ E(inc(φ i )) uniformly at random. Let x i be the variable endpoint of e.
4. Select α i ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
Solve satisfiability of φ i using a bounded-treewidth sub-solver. If unsatisfiable, simply return the answer. If satisfiable, compute a satisfying assignment of φ i and recover a satisfying assignment for φ using A 1 .
Figure 1: Algorithm Randomized-FPT-SAT-Weak
• Correctly concludes that φ has no weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k otherwise.
Proof. Since each iteration of this algorithm is dominated by the time required to run the (wb, K η , ρ)-reducer on input φ and there are at most k possible iterations, the bound on the running time of the algorithm follows. It is clear that if φ has no weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k, then the algorithm correctly concludes that there is not such backdoor set. Therefore, we only need to consider the case when a smallest weak K η -backdoor set for φ, say S, has size at most k. Observe that in this case, φ is satisfiable, and a satisfying assignment may be obtained by using a bounded-treewidth sub-solver (note that inc(φ) does not have η as a minor and hence its treewidth is bounded by at most η 100 ). We now prove the following claim regarding a run of the algorithm on the input (φ, k).
Claim 3.1. For each 0 ≤ i < k, with probability at least (
i+1 the following events occur.
2. φ i+1 has a weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k − (i + 1).
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. Consider the base case when i = 0. Let S 0 be a smallest weak K η -backdoor set for φ 0 . Since S 0 is a ρ-cover for φ 0 , we have that S 0 is a ρ d+1 -cover for inc(φ 0 ). Therefore, the probability of choosing an edge incident on S 0 is at least ρ d+1 which is also a lower bound on the probability that x 0 ∈ S 0 . Furthermore, algorithm A 1 by definition guarantees that φ 0 is equivalent to φ 0 and that |S 0 | ≤ k. Therefore, let τ * 0 : var(φ) → {0, 1} be a satisfying assignment of φ 0 such that
is also satisfiable and furthermore, S 0 \ {x 0 } is a weak K η -backdoor set for φ 0 [τ * 0 | x0 ]. Finally, the probability that φ 1 = φ 0 [τ * 0 | x0 ] is the probability that α 0 = τ * | x0 , which is at least 1 2 . Therefore, we conclude that with probability at least ρ 2(d+1) , φ 1 ≡ φ 0 and φ 1 has a weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k − 1.
We now move on to the induction step for i ≥ 1. Algorithm A 1 by definition guarantees that φ i is equivalent to φ i . Furthermore, by the induction hypothesis, with probability at least (
i+1 , we have that φ i ≡ φ, implying that φ i is satisfiable. Therefore, φ i is satisfiable. Also, we have that φ i has a weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k − i. Therefore, algorithm A 1 guarantees that φ has a weak K η -backdoor set, say S i of size at most
-cover of inc(φ i ), the probability that x i ∈ S i is at least and therefore both events occur with probability at least (
i+1 . This completes the proof of the claim.
Given the above claim, it follows that with probability at least (
k , for some ≤ k, the formula φ ∈ K η and φ ≡ φ. Since φ is satisfiable, so is φ and this is correctly detected by a bounded-treewidth sub-solver. Finally, we can compute the satisfying assignment for φ by starting with a satisfying assignment for φ and applying the algorithm A 1 iteratively to the formulas φ , φ −1 , . . . , φ 1 . This completes the proof of the lemma.
We now give a deterministic version of the above algorithm. Our branching strategy is based on the intuition that a subset of vertices that covers a constant fraction of all the edges in G must contain sufficiently many vertices of high degree. Equivalently, a set of variables that form a ρ-cover must contain some variables that occur with a substantial frequency among the clauses of φ. We use a partition of the variables according to frequency that formalizes this intuition, which is based on the definitions in [7] . Indeed, our Input: (φ, k), where φ is a d-CNF formula, and k is a positive integer. Output: Fail if φ has no weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k, a satisfying assignment τ * otherwise. if k = 0 and φ / ∈ K η : then return Fail if k = 0 and φ ∈ K η : then Solve SAT for φ in polynomial time. if φ has a satisfying assignment τ * : then return τ * if φ is not satisfiable: then return Fail if k > 0 then φ := A(φ) Compute the buckets B 1 , . . . , B log n for φ for each big bucket B i do for each subset S ⊆ B i such that
branching algorithm is exactly along the same lines; however, we present the details here for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 3.2. Let (A, A ) be a (wb, K η , ρ)-reducer. Then, there is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a d-CNF formula φ and an integer k, runs in time 2 O(k) (|φ| + T A (|φ|) + T A (|φ|)) and
• concludes correctly that φ has no weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k.
Proof. We first execute the algorithm A on input φ (see Algorithm 1) to obtain a formula φ such that φ has a weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k if and only if φ has a weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k and furthermore, any S ⊆ var(φ ) which is a weak K η -backdoor set is a ρ-cover of φ for some constant ρ < 1. Let G = inc(φ ). The branching strategy is based on a partition the variables of φ into sets, called buckets, which are defined as follows. For each i ≥ 1, we let:
Fix constants µ and such that (4 +3µ) 2 < ρ d+1 and let X be a fixed smallest weak K η -backdoor set. We call a bucket B i big if |B i | > iµ and we call it good if
We compute the buckets, and for each big bucket B i , for every subset S of B i of size at least |B i |, for every partial truth assignment τ to the variables in S, we recurse on the instance (φ [τ ], k −|S|). We return that φ is satisfiable if for some bucket B i and some subset S and some assignment τ , the recursion (φ [τ ], k − |S|) returned it is satisfiable and we return that φ has no weak K η -backdoor set of size at most k otherwise. We now turn to the proof of correctness and analysis of running time.
Claim 3.2. There is a bucket which is both big and good.
Proof. Since X is a ρ d+1 -cover in inc(φ ), we have that
· 2m, where m = |E(G)|. If there were no buckets which are good as well as big, then we have the following. For the sake of contradiction, assume that φ does not have a bucket that is both big and good. Then, we have the following.
The correctness of the algorithm follows from the above claim and the exhaustiveness of the branching. We now analyze the running time. Suppose for the sake of analysis that all buckets are big, and let a i be the size of bucket i. Then we have that
Assuming T (k) = x k , substitute recursively to get: < 1 then each term of the sum is maximized when the exponent is as small as possible. We will choose x (based on ) such that 2 x < 1 holds. Since a i ≥ µi for any big bucket we have that
The sum above is a geometric series and converges to a value that is at most 1 for x = c, for a suitably small choice of c depending only on and µ, which depended only on η. This bounds the running time by c k . Further, if not all buckets are big the sum above should only be done over the big buckets, yielding the same result.
3.2 d-SAT parameterized by strong K η -backdoor sets We now introduce Algorithm 2, which is a deterministic algorithm that either determines the satisfiability of the input formula, or declares that the input formula has no strong K η -backdoor of size at most k. The overall branching strategy is rather similar to Algorithm 1, however, the manner in which the outputs of the recursive subroutines are merged is more intricate in this case, and there are subtle differences that will be apparent in the proof of correctness.
there is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a d-CNF formula φ and an integer k, runs in time
• concludes correctly that φ has no K η strong backdoor set of size at most k.
Proof. As with the proof of Lemma 3.2, we begin by running the algorithm A on φ to ensure that φ is an equivalent instance where every strong backdoor set of size at most k is a ρ-cover for some constant ρ. We then classify the variables into different buckets according to 
Let (A, A ) be the (sb, K η , ρ) assumed reducer. Let φ * denote the output of A(φ). Compute the buckets B 1 , . . . , B log n for φ * . for each big bucket B i do Let S := {S | S ⊆ B i and |S| ≥ · |B i |}.
their degree, and we will have, as before, that there is a bucket that is both large and also contributes a constant fraction of its vertices to the ρ-cover.
We remark that the analysis of the running time of the algorithm is identical to the analysis in Lemma 3.2. Therefore, we now focus on the proof of correctness for Algorithm 2. Note that the algorithm has three possible outputs; namely Yes, No, and Fail. We claim that if the algorithm reports Fail, then φ has no K η strong backdoor set of size at most k. On the other hand, if the algorithm returns Yes (respectively, No), then φ has a satisfying assignment (respectively, is not satisfiable). We proceed by induction on k. In the base case, when k = 0, if φ ∈ K η , then a small-treewidth sub-solver for SAT will correctly determine the satisfiability of φ, so the correctness of these outputs follow. On the other hand, if φ / ∈ K η , then there is (by definition) no strong K η -backdoor of size k, and accordingly, the output is Fail.
Our induction hypothesis is that the output of the algorithm on (φ, ) is correct for all values of ≤ k, on all formulas φ. Now, consider the behavior of the algorithm on (φ, k + 1). By the correctness of the replacer algorithm, the formula φ * has a strong K η -backdoor of size at most (k + 1) if and only if φ has a strong K η -backdoor of size at most (k + 1). The algorithm then proceeds to examine all subsets of size at most (k + 1) of the big buckets. We now show that the output of the algorithm is correct for all of its possible outputs, which leads us to the following cases.
-SolveSB ((φ, k) 
Observe that solveSB((φ, k + 1)) returns Yes if, and only if, there is a subset S ∈ S for which z[S] was Yes. This in turn is true if, and only if, there is an assignment τ ∈ 2 S to the variables in S for which SolveSB((φ * [τ ], k − b)) returns Yes. Inductively, this implies that φ * [τ ] is in fact a satisfiable formula. Let τ then be a satisfying assignment for
. Note that τ * (x), given by:
is a satisfying assignment for φ * . By the equivalence of φ and φ * with respect to satisfiability (as guaranteed by the reducer) we know that φ is also satisfiable, concluding the proof.
In this case, solveSB((φ, k + 1)) returns No if, and only if, there is a subset S ∈ S for which z[S] was No. This in turn is true if, and only if, there for
is not satisfiable for any assignment to the variables in S, we know that φ * is also not satisfiable. Indeed, suppose to the contrary that φ * does admit a satisfying assignment τ * . Then the formula φ * [τ * S ] would be satisfiable as well, which contradicts the induction hypothesis. The correctness again follows from the equivalence of φ and φ * with respect to satisfiability.
-SolveSB((φ, k)) = Fail. Here, we have that solveSB((φ, k + 1)) returns Fail if, and only if, for all subsets S ∈ S, z[S] is Fail. In other words, for every subset S ∈ S, there is an assignment τ S to the variables of S for which SolveSB((φ * [τ S ], k + 1 − |S|)) is Fail. By the induction hypothesis, we have that the formulas φ * [τ S ] do not admit a strong backdoors of size at most k+1−|S| for every S ∈ S.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, φ * does admit a strong K η -backdoor of size at most k + 1. Since φ * is the output of a (sb, K η , ρ)-reducer, we know every K η -backdoor in φ * is a ρ-cover, and therefore intersects a large fraction of one of the sets in S. In particular, let S * be a strong backdoor of size at most (k+1) such that its intersection with B i is at least |B i |. Then S := S * ∩ B i ∈ S, and for any τ ∈ 2 S , we have that φ * [τ ] does admit a strong backdoor of size at most k + 1 − |S |, indeed, S * ∩var(φ * [τ ]) would be such a strong backdoor. However, by the discussion above, there exists an assignment τ to S for which SolveSB((φ * [τ , k + 1 − |S |)) returns Fail, contradicting the induction hypothesis. The correctness for (φ, k + 1) follows from the equivalence of φ and φ * with respect to having strong backdoors of size at most (k + 1), as guaranteed by the reducer.
Observe that the case analysis above is exhaustive, and establishes the correctness of Algorithm 2.
We conclude at this point by observing that combining Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 along with the existence of the appropriate reduces gives us two algorithms -one for d-SAT parameterized by the size of a smallest weak K t -backdoor and one for d-SAT parameterized by the size of a smallest strong K t -backdoor. For any input (φ, k), we can in fact run both algorithms on the same input, giving us Theorem 1.1.
Fixed
Parameterized Tractability of computing weak W η -backdoor sets We also obtain the following fixed parameter tractability result (assuming appropriate reducers) for the problem of deciding if a given formula has a weak W η backdoor set of size at most k. Theorem 3.1. There is an algorithm that, given a d-CNF formula φ and an integer k, runs in time 2 O(k) |φ| and either returns a set of at most k variables which form a W η weak backdoor set or correctly concludes that such a set does not exist.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we repurpose the algorithm of Lemma 3.1, where instead of just fixing a random assignment to a randomly chosen variable, we now also add this variable to the W η weak backdoor set. Therefore, it suffices to have a linear time (wb, W η , ρ)-reducer. This gives a randomized 2 O(k) |φ| algorithm to detect weak W η -backdoor sets of size at most k. This algorithm can be derandomized identical to the way the algorithm of Lemma 3.1 is derandomized in Lemma 3.2. The correctness and running time bounds of this algorithm follow along the same lines as those for the algorithm of Lemma 3.2.
Fast Protrusion Replacement
In this section, we present our linear time algorithm to detect protrusions that cover a sufficiently part of a given graph. Using this algorithm, we prove our Linear Time Protrusion Replacement Theorem. Although the main motivation behind designing this algorithm is to achieve reducers that run in linear time for d-SAT, this theorem is developed in a much more general setting so as to facilitate "black-box" applications and can also be invoked directly to improve several existing kernelization as well as FPT results. We begin by recalling the notions of protrusion covers. A (a, b, r, η) -protrusion cover in a graph G is a collection Z = Z 1 , . . . , Z q of sets such that
The size of Z is denoted by |Z|.
Note that the protrusions in a (a, b, r, η)-protrusion cover are not necessarily connected. However, the following lemma shows that we may make this assumption at a cost of decreasing the lower bound on the sizes of the protrusions. Proof. Let Z 1 , . . . , Z p be the partition of the sets in Z according to their neighborhood. Furthermore, for each Z i , let P i denote a subset of Z i such that for every Z ∈ Z i , there is a set P ∈ P i such that |P | ≥ s 2 r and the connected components of G[P ] have the same neighborhood. Since each Z ∈ Z i has size at least s and neighbourhood at most r, such a P exists for every Z and therefore P i exists for every Z i . Observe that the set P = {P i |i ∈ [p]} is indeed a ( s 2 r , 6s, r, η)-protrusion cover satisfying the conditions in the statement of the lemma.
Clearly, it is very desirable to be able to compute protrusion covers of large size, which then allows us to reduce the size of instances by a significant amount. Our next algorithm achieves this -in linear time, it computes a protrusion cover which "approximates" any protrusion cover in the graph with certain parameters. We use the following algorithm for enumerating small connected components with a small neighborhood. Proof. For every vertex v ∈ V (G), we use Proposition 4.1 to enumerate the family
Since enumerating the family S v for each vertex takes constant time, the sets S v for all vertices can be computed in time O(n). For every v ∈ V (G), we discard the sets S ∈ S v such that tw(G[S]) > t. Since we can use the algorithm of Bodlaender [3] to compute the treewidth of each S ∈ S v in constant time, the discarding process taken over the sets S v for all v ∈ V (G) can be done linear time. Let S * = v∈V (G) S v . We now group the sets in S * according to their neighbourhood. More precisely, we compute a partition of S * where sets with the same neighbourhood are in the same class of the partition. This can be done as follows (see for example [7] ). Fix an ordering of the vertex set of G and sort the neighbor lists of each set in S * . Following this, in r stable bucket sorts, we can sort the sets in S * based on their 'first' neighbor first, then the 'second' and so on. This procedure takes time O(nr) since |S * | = O(n) and each set in S * has a boundary of size at most r. Let X 1 , . . . , X q be the partition of S * obtained as described above. Observe that for any i ∈ [q], for any S 1 , S 2 ∈ X i , S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅. This follows from the fact that G[S 1 ] and G[S 2 ] are both connected. More precisely, if S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅ then S 1 must have a neighbor in S 2 , contradicting the fact that they lie in the same class of the partition.
We now club together certain sets in each class of the partition together as follows. For each X i do the following. As long as
and add it to the set Y and remove the sets in this collection from X i . We repeat this step as long as possible. Observe that each time we add a minimal collection X i ⊆ X i to Y, it must be the case that Before describing the subsequent steps of the algorithm, we prove a bound on the size of the set Y assuming the existence of a ( s 2 r , 6s, r, η)-protrusion cover Z. Let Z 1 , . . . , Z p be the partition of the sets in Z according to their neighbourhood. Observe that for each i ∈ [p], Z i is a subset of X j for some unique j, denoted by σ(i). We will show that for Z i , the number of collections contributed by X σ(i) to the set Y is a constant fraction of the number of sets in Z i .
More precisely, let V i be the set of vertices in the union of the sets in Z i . Since every set in Z i has size at least s 2 r , the size of each set Z i is at most . Finally, the number of vertices contained in the union of the sets in Y u for any u ∈ V (H) is bounded by 7s and each Y u is a union of sets in S * . Therefore, the degree of any vertex in H is bounded by λ = (7s + r) · 6s+r r
. Therefore, we can compute in time O(V (H)+E(H)) an independent set in H of size at least |V (H)| λ+1 . We set Z to be the collection of sets corresponding to the vertices in this independent set. It is clear that Z indeed is a ( s 2 r , 7s, r, η)-protrusion cover of G. Therefore, it only remains to prove the required lower bound on the size of Z . Set δ = ω (λ+1) . Observe that the size of Z is at least a 1 λ+1 fraction of |V (H)|, which in turn is at least ω|Z|. This completes the proof of the lemma.
In particular, the above lemma implies that if G has a protrusion-cover Z such that a constant fraction of vertices of G appear in distinct reducible sets in Z, then we can reduce G by a constant fraction of its vertices in linear time by computing a large enough approximate protrusion cover and then invoking the appropriate protrusion replacer, leading to a linear time algorithm for protrusion replacement. We now state and prove our theorem formally. Before we state the theorem, we recall the following lemma from [7] relating protrusion decompositions and protrusion covers with certain size guarantees.
Lemma 4.3. [7] Let G be a graph with a (α, β, η)-protrusion decomposition. Then, for all s > β, G has a (s, 6s, 3(β + 1), η)-protrusion cover of size at least n 122s − α. Theorem 4.1. (Linear Time Protrusion Replacement Theorem) Let Π be a problem that has a protrusion replacer which replaces r protrusions of size at least r for some fixed r. Let s and β be constants such that s ≥ r · 2 r and r ≥ 3(β + 1). Given an instance (G, k) as input, there is an algorithm that runs in time O(m + n) and produces an equivalent instance (G , k ) with |V (G )| ≤ |V (G)| and k ≤ k. If additionally G has a (α, β)-protrusion decomposition such that α ≤ n 244s , then we have that |V (G )| ≤ (1 − δ)|V (G)| for some constant δ.
Proof. We first run the algorithm of Lemma 4.2 with the parameters r and s to compute a ( s 2 r , 7s, r, r)-protrusion cover Z. Since s 2 r > r , each set in Z is a reducible protrusion and therefore we invoke the protrusion replacer to reduce all protrusions in Z to get an equivalent instance (G , k ), where |V (G )| ≤ |V (G)| − |Z|. We now claim that if G has a (α, β)-protrusion decomposition such that α ≤ n 244s , then we have that |Z| ≥ δV (G) for some constant δ, implying that |V (G )| ≤ (1 − δ)|V (G)|.
By Lemma 4.3 we know that if G has a (α, β)-protrusion decomposition then for all s > β, G has a (s, 6s, 3(β + 1), r)-protrusion cover of size at least n 122s − α ≤ n 244s . Furthermore, by Lemma 4.1, we know that G has a ( s 2 r , 6s, r, r)-protrusion cover Z of size at least n 244s such that for every Z ∈ Z , the connected components of G[Z] have the same neighbourhood. However, in this case Lemma 4.2 guarantees that the computed protrusion cover Z has size at least δ |Z | for some constant δ . Therefore, setting δ = δ 244s completes the proof of the theorem.
